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CONFLICT OF LAWS: CONTRACTS AND OTHER
OBLIGATIONS
In ordering relations between parties to a contract, the courts
have developed standards for choosing between conflicting laws of
two or more jurisdictions in at least four areas of contract law: capac-
ity of the parties to contract, availability and nature of the remedy,
formal validity, and substantive validity.' Of the fascicle of conflicts
rules applicable to such a problem, those providing the substantive
law to determine the validity of the alleged contract have been dealt
1. Louisiana jurisprudence peculiarly splits these considerations of conflicts prob-
lems sounding in contract into separate categories. Capacity: The law of the domicile
of the parties in question controls the capacity to contract. See Pilcher v. Paulk, 228
So. 2d 663 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (minors); Sun Oil Co. v. Guidry, 99 So. 2d 424 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1957) (minors). Louisiana courts have regularly held that the law of the
domicile of the parties governs the capacity of a party to contract with his or her spouse
for a regime other than the community of gains, or for a settlement or division of
property owned in common. Marriages contracted by Louisiana domiciliaries in foreign
places are generally held valid in Louisiana if valid at the place of contracting, unless
contracted in fraud of our laws. In addition, Louisiana courts have usually held valid
property settlements and contracts between husband and wife contracted in good faith
in another state before the parties moved to Louisiana. These cases have been variously
treated as application of the law of the domicile rule or as the rule of lex loci contractus.
For applications of the law of the domicile rule, see Lorio v. Gladney, 147 La. 930, 86
So. 365 (1920); Freret v. Taylor, 119 La. 307, 44 So. 26 (1907); Marks v. Germania
Savings Bank, 110 La. 659, 34 So. 725 (1903); Succession of Hernandez, 46 La. Ann.
962, 15 So. 461 (1894); Hyman, Lichtenstein & Co. v. Schlenker, 44 La. Ann. 108, 10
So. 623 (1892). For application of the rule of lex loci contractus see Marks v. Loewen-
berg, 143 La. 196, 78 So. 444 (1918); Bank of Lumberton v. Hinton, 123 La. 1018, 49
So. 692 (1909); Heine v. Mechanics & Traders Ins. Co., 45 La. Ann. 770, 13 So. 1 (1893);
Succession of Caballero v. The Executor, 24 La. Ann. 573 (1872); Succession of Wilder,
22 La. Ann. 219 (1870); Succession of Packwood, 9 Rob. 38 (La. 1845); Pritchard v.
Citizen's Bank, 8 La. 130 (1835); Murphy's Heirs v. Murphy, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 83 (La.
1817); Le Breton v. Nouchet, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 60 (La. 1813). There are apparently no
cases involving conflicts problems dealing with the capacity of the insane. Remedy:
The law of the forum (lex fori) where the remedy is sought determines both the availa-
bility and the nature of the remedy when available. See, e.g., Tyree v. Sands, 24 La.
Ann. 363 (1872); Jackson v. Tiernan, 15 La. 485 (1840); Morris v. Eves, 11 Mart. (O.S.)
730 (La. 1822); Bologna Bros. v. Morrissey, 154 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
Formal Validity: The formal validity of a contract is determined by the lex loci
contractus. LA. CIv. CODE art. 10. Note that the exception in paragraph 2 is limited to
effect and does not include form. Cf. Gaites v. Gaither, 46 La. Ann. 286, 15 So. 50
(1894); Vidal v. Thompson, 11 Mart. (O.S.) 23 (La. 1822); The Uniform Wills Act, LA.
R.S. 9:2401 (1950); Uniform Probate Law, LA. R.S. 9:2421-25 (1950). Validity: The
determination of the applicable law governing the validity of a contract is the subject
of the balance of this paper.
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with most frequently by the courts. Three principal rules have been
stated in the cases considering substantive validity: lex loci
contractus, lex loci solutionis, and the party-autonomy rule.' That
these rules are opposed to one another when mechanically applied
has not always been recognized by Louisiana courts.3 "No area in the
entire law of conflicts of law has been more confused from the begin-
ning than that concerning the general validity of contracts."' The
following analysis of Louisiana legislation in comparison to the
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws5 and selected Louisiana juris-
prudence reveals, however, a perceivable methodology in the courts'
approaches to conflicts problems in contract.
Three Conflicts Rules
The law of the place where the contract is made is often used to
determine its validity (lex loci contractus). The rationale of this rule
is that parties are presumed to have contracted with reference to or
in contemplation of the place where they entered the contract., If two
parties were in the same state at the time of making and intended
performance there, but subsequently litigate their contractual rights
in another forum, the rule merely states that the forum state will
apply the law that would have governed their rights had they stayed
at home.7 However, if the parties at the time of contracting contem-
plated that their contract would have effects in another state this rule
would arbitrarily cut off consideration of other issues relevant to the
choice of substantive law.'
2. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 355 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LEFLAR].
3. See, e.g., Trabue v. Short, 18 La. Ann. 257 (1866); Bacon v. Dalgreen, 7 La.
Ann. 599 (1852).
4. LEFLAR at 355.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § § 186-207 (1969).
6. See generally 2 J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332.4 (1935); LEFLAR at 353-72.
Professor Leflar notes that Massachusetts is the only state that has consistently ad-
hered to this rule.
7. One exception which cuts across all rules of conflicts but is most frequently
encountered in connection with lex loci contractus is that if the foreign law otherwise
applicable is contrary to the public policy of the forum, application of the indicative
rule will be suspended. Cf. Griffin v. McCoach, 31 U.S. 498 (1941); Le Breton v.
Nouchet, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 60 (La. 1813); LEFLAR §§ 50, 149.
8. Contracts formed by correspondence or negotiated in one state and concluded
in another raise the difficulty of determining where the contract was made. In Anglo-
American jurisdictions and Louisiana the rule is that the contract is made at the time
and place when final assent is given, the last act necessary to completion of the
contract is done or the contract first creates a legal obligation. Whiston v. Stodder, 8
Mart. (O.S.) 95 (La. 1820). Cf. LEFLAR § 144; 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 97 (3d ed.
1957) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON]. The "final assent" may be stipulated by the
1974]
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The law of the place where the contract is to be performed may
also be offered as controlling the validity of the contract (lex loci
solutionis).' In Louisiana, although only one case has been found that
voices this rule,'0 several important cases advert to the seemingly
related concept that the parties' intent to be governed by the law of
a certain place may be inferred from their intent that performance
be in that place." When this intent is inferred from the terms of the
contract, the case is said to be taken out of the general rule of lex loci
contractus because the actual intent of the parties governs. In many
cases, the place where performance is to take place has more relev-
ance to the relationship of the parties than the place where they
established that relationship. However, contracts which distribute
performance over more than one state attenuate that relevance con-
siderably. 2
The third and most liberal conflicts rule is that the express or
implied intent of the parties to be governed by the law of a particular
place determines the choice of substantive law."3 This concept, styled
parties (order blanks furnished traveling salesmen containing a stipulation that no
contract arises until approval by the home office; insurance policies that do not come
into effect until the first premium is paid; negotiable instruments, deeds and insurance
policies that become effective only on delivery). LEFLAR § 144; WILLISTON § 76. See
Deane v. McGee, 261 La. 686, 260 So. 2d 669 (1972); Greverig v. Washington Life Ins.
Co., 112 La. 879, 36 So. 790 (1903); Morrison v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d
418 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); cf. First Nat'l. Bank v. Stovall, 128 So. 2d 712 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1961); Ferguson v. Hartford Live Stock Ins. Co., 39 So. 2d 108 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1948); Lowery v. Zorn, 157 So. 826 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934). But see Harmon v.
Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 164 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
9. LEFLAR § 145. See also Comment, 6 TUL. L. REv. 454 (1932).
10. Stanton v. Harvey, 44 La. Ann. 511, 10 So. 778 (1892). See also Comment, 38
TUL. L. REv. 726, 729 (1964). However, the cases cited therein do not support the
proposition that lex loci solutionis is the proper rule of Civil Code article 10. In
Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882), the United States Supreme Court arguably
applied this rule to a case arising in Louisiana. However, the Court was not construing
Louisiana law of conflicts. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Further, the
holding of Pritchard clearly states that the rule was applied as a presumption of the
intent of the parties. 106 U.S. at 141.
11. See, e.g., Gates v. Gaither, 46 La. Ann. 286, 15 So. 50 (1894); Duncan v. Helm,
22 La. Ann. 418 (1870); Universal CIT Corp. v. Hulett, 151 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1963).
12. See, e.g., Harmon v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 164 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1964). Cf. Lachman v. Block, 47 La. Ann. 505, 17 So. 153 (1894) in which the court
seemingly applied lex loci solutionis, but the criteria relied on appeared to be indistin-
guishable from a description of the characteristics of an application of lex loci
contractus.
13. See generally LEFLAR § 145; James, Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties
on Conflict-of-Laws Contracts, 36 CHI-KENT L. REv. 34, 87 (1959); James, Effects of
the Autonomy of the Parties on Conflicts-of-Laws Contracts Involving Capacity, 23 U.
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the party-autonomy rule, has found much popularity in American
courts." Although early Louisiana cases seldom applied it as a de-
clared rule of decision, it was implicit in the application of the other
two rules. Moreover, this rule seems to be a basis of article 10 of the
Civil Code, and has been so recognized sporadically since the turn of
the century.'5
The Restatements
The first Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, based on a minority
doctrine which prevailed neither in Louisiana"6 nor in American
courts, took the position that contract validity was governed by the
lex ioci contractus while issues of performance were to be determined
by the lex loci solutionis.7 The Restatement (Second), on the other
hand, adopts the party-autonomy rule coupled with the "center of
PITT. L. REV. 705 (1962); James, Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on the Validity
of Conflicts-of-Laws Sales Contracts, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 223 (1960). Professor James
treats specific contractual problems in the balance of this exhaustive series of articles.
See also James, Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on the Validity of Conflict-
of-Laws Contracts Under the Statute of Frauds, 3 AIuz. L. REv. 23 (1961); James,
Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on the Validity of Conflict-of-Laws- "Illegal
Contracts"-Sunday, Gambling, Lottery and Other Agreements, 8 AM. U.L. REv. 67
(1959); James, Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on the Validity of Conflict-of-
Laws of Surety and Guaranty Contracts, 9 AM. U.L. REV. 24 (1960); James, Effects of
Federal Due Process of Law and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a Forum State
Using Its Public Policy to Negate Parties' Autonomy on the Validity of Conflicts-of-
Laws Contracts, 41 Cm-KENT L. REV. 1 (1964).
14. LEFLAR § 145 nn. 3, 4.
15. Gates v. Gaither, 46 La. Ann. 286, 15 So. 50 (1894) affirmed a concept first
appearing in Bernard v. Scott, 12 La. Ann. 489 (1857) to this effect.
16. Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 569 (La. 1827). See Comment, 38 TUL.
L. REV. 726, 736 (1964) in which the writer provides an interesting sketch of the possible
effects of Samuel Livermore's (the losing attorney in Saul) first American treatise on
conflicts of laws, written in New Orleans in 1828.
17. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 358 (1934); see also RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note to Chapter 8 (1969). The position of the first
Restatement is equivalent to the interpretation of article 10 found in Depau v.
Humphreys, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 1 (La. 1829).
Beal's territorialist theory of vested rights, in light of which the first Restatement
was drafted, was that the location of some single most significant factor in a transac-
tion (situs of land, place where contract was made, place of impact of a tort) should
identify the place (state) whose law should govern the transaction. Rights and obliga-
tions were said to have vested at the vital time and place at which that factor occurred
in accordance with the law of that state. The court at any subsequently selected forum
had only to determine (characterize) the nature of the issue before them (land, title,
contract, tort, procedure), refer to the choice-of-law rule conceptually appropriate to
that type of case (place of contracting, place of harm) and apply the rule to the facts.
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gravity" or "substantial contacts" test to be applied in the absence
of effective party choice."8
Louisiana Legislation
Article 10 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870 provides in part:
The form and effect of public and 'private written instru-
ments are governed by the laws and usages of the places where
they are passed or executed.
But the effect of acts passed in one country to have effect in
another country, is regulated by the laws of the country where
such acts are to have effect.
Although the English version of the 1825 Code is almost identical, 9
the French version of that Code provides in the second paragraph
that "the effects of acts passed to be executed in another country are
regulated by the laws of the country where they are to be executed."2"
The language of both the French and English versions is susceptible
of the construction that the law of the place of contracting governs
the validity of the obligation, whereas the law of the place of perform-
ance regulates the incidents of performance. A prima facie reading of
both versions of the article might also lead to the conclusion that it
is a statement of the lex loci solutionis rule. However, the supreme
court rejected the latter construction shortly after the promulgation
of the 1825 Code, 2' and has also indicated that the basis of the lex
loci contractus is the presumed intent of the parties." Thus, a more
reasonable construction of article 10 is that it embodies the principle
&at parties are free, within limits, to determine which law will gov-
ern their contract.
Furthermore, a careful analysis of the wording of article 10 sup-
ports the proposition that it is the expression of the party-autonomy
rule rather than lex loci solutionis. Article 10 provides that the con-
tract is governed by the law of the place where it is to have effect. In
order to reasonably construe this article, the effect of a contract must
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 186-207 (1969).
19. The Civil Code of 1825 contained a comma after the words "one country."
20. 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 10 (J. Dainow
ed.). The Digest of 1808 translated the first five words of the French version as "[tihe
form and force of .... " For a discussion of the possible source of the 1808 article in
Las Siete Partidas, see Comment, 38 TUL. L. REv. 726, 730 (1964).
21. Depau v. Humphreys, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 1 (La. 1829).
22. See, e.g., Gates v. Gaither, 46 La. Ann. 286, 15 So. 50 (1894); Duncan v. Helm,
22 La. Ann. 418 (1870); Beirne v. Patton, 17 La. 589 (1841); Le Breton v. Nouchet, 3
Mart. (O.S.) 60 (La. 1813).
(Vol. 35
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be distinguished from its performance. Suppose that Aramis and
Bathos both reside in Louisiana at the time of contracting. Aramis
agrees to pay Bathos $5 in return for Bathos' performance of some
service for him while vacationing in California. Clearly, Bathos' per-
formance under the contract is to take place in California. If he fails
to perform and Aramis seeks recovery in Louisiana, a court applying
the lex loci solutionis rule would hold that California law governs the
validity of the contract. On the other hand, if the court applies the
rule that the contract is governed by the law of the place where it is
to have effect, it would appear that the contract, having created its
obligations between the parties in Louisiana, has its effect in that
state. It is reasonable to infer that the parties, being residents of
Louisiana and having entered the contract while in that state, in-
tended their obligations to subsist under Louisiana law. Likewise,
even if the same contract was made by the same Louisiana residents
during a temporary sojourn in Mississippi, it would seem reasonable
to infer that the parties intended the contract to have effect in Louis-
iana rather than in Mississippi. 3
Thus, the words "to have effect" in article 10 may be construed
as a short-hand expression of the concept that the intent of the par-
ties governs the choice of substantive law. 4 In the absence of an
23. To take another example, suppose that in Texas, Dealer sells Buyer an auto-
mobile under a contract stipulating that if Buyer defaults on the payment of the price,
the ownership of the automobile will revert automatically to Dealer. Dealer knows,
however, that Buyer is a resident of Maringouin, La. and that he plans to return to
his home immediately after completing the sale. Since the parties contemplate that
the object of the sale will be kept in Louisiana, and since the outstanding performance,
viz., payment of the price in installments is contemplated to be performed by one
residing in Louisiana, and, especially, since the parties know that Dealer must seek
Buyer and the automobile in Louisiana in order to enforce his rights, it is reasonable
to infer that the parties intended the contract to have effect in Louisiana. On the other
hand, it may be said that since Dealer's performance under the contract took place in
Texas and the price was due in Texas, Buyer's performance was to take place in Texas.
Thus, the performance rule would indicate the application of Texas law, whereas the
party-autonomy rule as expressed in article 10 indicates the application of Louisiana
law.
24. Interestingly, this precise mode of expression was employed by the supreme
court in describing the construction of the Bretton Woods Agreement by federal courts
in Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 245 La. 755, 767, 161 So. 2d 70, 74
(1964). In Bernard v. Scott, 12 La. Ann. 489, 490-91 (1857) (concurring opinion),
Justice Cole stated: "Article [10] does not speak of the interpretation of Acts as to
their character, form and nature, but as to their effect . . . . The latter part of this
Article shows that the word "effect" has no reference to the form ... of the Act, but
only to the result and consequence .... " Justice Cole indicated that he would have
held that an act passed in a foreign place must be taken as a manifestation of the wills
of the parties and given effect in Louisiana to the extent that it is not repugnant to
our law. For facts of the case see text at note 46 infra.
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express or implied indication of intent, the parties' preference of con-
trolling law should be inferred by deciding which state has the most
significant contacts with the parties' contractual relationship."8 The
place of contracting, the place of performance, the situs of the object
of the contract and the domicile of the parties are some of the con-
tacts which should be considered.
This construction of article 10, as a rdflection of the party-
autonomy rule, comports with the position taken by the Restatement
(Second)."8 Section 1887 provides certain factors to be considered in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. These factors
establish the "most significant relationship" of the parties' transac-
tion to one of the competing states. This test has received little atten-
tion from Louisiana courts per se, but the factors listed in § 188(2)
including, inter alia, the place of contracting, the place of perform-
ance, and the place of the negotiation of the contract have been used
by Louisiana courts."8 It would seem that Louisiana courts have, in
reality, applied the party-autonomy rule, and that expressions in the
jurisprudence indicating adherence to lex loci contractus and lex loci
solutionis should be viewed merely as judicial determinations of
effective party choice or that in the absence of effective party choice,
the place of contracting or the place of performance, as the case may
be, bore the most significant relationship to the contract."
25. Universal CIT Credit Corp. v. Hulett, 151 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 186-88 (1969) deal with particu-
lar contracts and issues, the elements of which are beyond the scope of this comment.
27. Id. § 188: "Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties
(1) the rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are deter-
mined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has most signifi-
cant relationship to the transaction and the parties . . . . (2) In the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties . . . the contacts to be taken into account...
include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of busi-
ness of the parties.
These contacts are to be evalutated according to their relative importance with respect
to a particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the
same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied .... "
28. See, e.g., Duncan v. Helm, 22 La. Ann. 418 (1870); Beirne v. Patton, 17 La.
589 (1841); Morrison v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1965), revd on other grounds, 249 La. 546, 187 So. 2d 729 (1966); Harmon v. Lumber-
mens Mut. Ins. Co., 164 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
29. The party-autonomy rule is further limited by an exception made in Morris
v. Eves, 11 Mart. (O.S.) 730 (La. 1822). The court reasoned that as no state was bound
[Vol. 35
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Louisiana Jurisprudence
An examination of the Louisiana jurisprudence supports the con-
struction of article 10 as enunciating the party-autonomy rule. In Le
Breton v. Nouchet,5 the first case in which the Louisiana supreme
court resolved a conflicts question arising in contract, the court gave
expression to a choice of law approach which continued to appear in
both the jurisprudence and applicable legislation throughout the cen-
tury. Defendant, a Louisiana resident, sought to avoid the operation
of Louisiana law by fleeing to Natchez to marry his thirteen-year-old
bride. The court enunciated a general rule that parties contract
with reference to the laws of the place where they enter the legal rela-
tionship, in this case, Mississippi. However, for that rule to take
effect, "it must first be ascertained that the parties really intended
to be governed by those laws, and had not some other country in
contemplation at the time of the contract."'" Thus, the basis of the
lex loci contractus rule was defined by the court to be the presumed
intent of the parties to contract with reference to local law. However,
the court felt that the mere fact of contracting in another state was
insufficient indication of the minor's intent to renounce the protec-
tion she had under Louisiana's law. Because the actual intent of the
parties could be inferred from the exceptional circumstances, that
intent was held to be controlling and the court applied Louisiana law.
The idea that parties elect to be governed by the law of the place
of contracting was reiterated frequently during the nineteenth cen-
tury, but often without the acknowledgment found in LeBreton that
the actual intent of the parties could alter the effects of the rule.3" In
Depau v. Humphreys,"' the court characterized the lex loci contractus
doctrine as a rigid rule of decision and ignored the party-autonomy
basis the court had recognized in earlier cases.Y However, erosion of
to accept the laws of a foreign sovereign, a foreign rule of decision would not be
accepted to the prejudice of a Louisiana citizen or in fraud of Louisiana law. For a
discussion of problems in applying this rule, see Note, 33 LA. L. REv. 481 (1973).
30. 3 Mart. (O.S.) 60 (La. 1813).
31. Id. at 66 (Emphasis added).
32. In 1838, Justice Bullard stated that the doctrine of lex loci contractus is "well-
settled." Andrews v. His Creditors, 11 La. 464, 476 (1838). Cf. United States v. Bank
of the United States, 8 Rob. 262, 402, 406 (La. 1844); Shaw v. Oakey, 3 Rob. 361 (La.
1842); Briggs, Lacoste & Co. v. Campbell, 19 La. 524 (1841); Hall v. Mullhollan, 7 La.
383 (1834); Clague v. His Creditors, 2 La. 114 (1830); Miles v. Oden, 8 Mart. (N.S.)
214 (La. 1829).
33. 8 Mart. (N.S.) 1 (La. 1829). Although the "vested rights" doctrine was earlier
rejected in Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 569 (La. 1827), its product, the lex
loci contractus as a mechanical rule of decision, was preserved in Depau.
34. See, e.g., Chartres v. Cairnes, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 1 (La. 1825); Olivier v. Townes,
1974]
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lex loci contractus as an inflexible rule began in 1841 in Bierne v.
Patton,35 though there the competing doctrine was not the party-
autonomy rule. In Bierne the court gratuitously injected into its opin-
ion, "It is a well settled rule that where a contract is either expressly
or tacitly to be performed in another place than that where it is made,
its validity is to be governed by the law of the place of performance."'36
A careful reading of the facts of this case indidates that the court was
merely applying the corollary of lex loci contractus that the incidents
of performance are governed by the place of intended performance.37
However, the broad language in Bierne was cited in later cases as the
rule of decision and as authority for the lex loci solutionis standard."
A second indication of the weakening of the rule of lex loci
contractus is found in the interesting opinion of Bent v. Lauve.35
Though the court could have disposed of the case solely on the basis
of the law of the place of contracting, it chose to rely on Depau for
the proposition that it was "in accordance with well settled authority
to consider the parties as contemplating, and consequently bound by,
the laws of the place where supplies are furnished . .. ,"" It is signif-
icant that Justice Slidell cited Depau for this proposition, for that
case applied the lex loci contractus rule on the basis that the law of
the place of the contract was mandated by the rights of the parties
which vested when the parties entered the contract within the juris-
diction of the place. Perhaps the court was indicating that the appar-
ent conflict in the two courts' rationales was not to be regarded as
anomalous.
2 Mart. (N.S.) 93 (La. 1824); John Brown & Co. v. Richardson, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 202 (La.
1823); Evans v. Gray, 12 Mart. (O.S.) 475 (La. 1822), application for rehearing, 12
Mart. (O.S.) 507 (La. 1823), former judgment undisturbed, 12 Mart. (O.S.) 647 (La.
1823); Morris v. Eves, 11 Mart. (O.S.) 730 (La. 1822); Thuret v. Jenkins, 7 Mart. (O.S.)
318 (La. 1820); Lynch v. Postlethwaithe, 7 Mart. (O.S.) 69 (La. 1819); Norris v. Mum-
ford, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 20 (La. 1816).
35. 17 La. 589 (1841).
36. Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
37. See Vidal v. Thompson, 11 Mart. (O.S.) 23, 24 (La. 1822). Although Vidal
clearly spoke only of the modes and incidents of performance, it has been cited for the
proposition that the law of the place of performance governs the validity and the effect
of the contract. Bohn v. Cleaver, 25 La. Ann. 419 (1873); Duncan v. Helm, 22 La. Ann.
418 (1870); Bent v. Lauve, 3 La. Ann. 88 (1848). See also Comment, 6 TUL. L. REV.
454, 466 (1932).
38. See, e.g., Lachman v. Block, 47 La. Ann. 505, 17 So. 153 (1895); McIlvain v.
Legare, 36 La. Ann. 359 (1884); Duncan v. Helm, 22 La. Ann. 418 (1870). In the same
year, however, the court said in reaffirming the rule lex loci contractus that contracts
valid at the place of making are "valid everywhere by the tacit or implied consent of
the parties." Buckner v. Watt, 19 La. 216, 217 (1841) (Emphasis added).
39. 3 La. Ann. 88 (1848).
40. Id. at 89 (Emphasis added).
[Vol. 35
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A third indication that the court was beginning to doubt the
usefulness of the old rule was its sudden recognition of the existence
of Civil Code article 10. Nearly twenty years after its promulgation,
article 10 in its present form was judicially recognized in United
States v. Bank of the United States." In that case, although appear-
ing to apply the old rule, the court turned to the Code as authority
instead of relying exclusively on older cases which mechanically as-
serted the lex loci contractus rule."2 After several years of uncertainty
during which the judiciary vacillated between application of article
10 and a strict reliance on the jurisprudential doctrine of lex loci
contractus,43 the supreme court returned to the more rational analysis
of LeBreton and construed article 10 as an expression of the party-
autonomy rule. In Spears v. Shropshire44 the court considering a
wife's claim for property under a marriage settlement made in Missis-
sippi stated:
The contract in question was executed in Mississippi, where all
the parties resided, and was intended to have effect there. Its
effect must, therefore, be governed by the law of Mississippi. C.C.
Art. 10. 4
5
41. 8 Rob. 262 (La. 1844). The court also cited La. Code of Practice art. 13 (1825):
"[Clontracts are to be governed by the law of the place where they were entered into,"
but did not attempt to reconcile it with Civil Code art. 10. Id. at 406.
42. A further indication of a more liberal approach in this case is the court's
lengthy discussion of the effects of applying foreign law versus Louisiana law. The more
usual judicial process of the time would have been a search for "the rule" and a
discussion of the relative merits of different rules with little attention to the legislation.
See, e.g., Oliver v. Lake, 3 La. Ann. 78 (1848); Colt v. O'Callaghan, 2 La. Ann. 984
(1847); Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946 (1847); Lee v. His Creditors, 2 La. Ann. 599
(1847).
43. See Trabue v. Short, 18 La. Ann. 257 (1866); Fell v. Darden, 17 La. Ann. 236
(1865); Dord v. Bonnaffee, 6 La. Ann. 563 (1851). In Fell, the court purported to apply
article 10 but cited two cases decided five years before the 1825 Code to support its
decision. In Trabue the court neutralized a grudging acknowledgment that article 10
permitted the parties to select the law governing their relationship by requiring the
selection to be express. The struggle has continued well into this century. For examples
of mechanical applications of lex loci contractus see Fox v. Corry, 149 La. 445, 89 So.
410 (1920); Bologna Bros. v. Morrissey, 154 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Delta
Equip. v. Cook, 142 So. 2d 427 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); Lewis v. Columbia Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 197 So. 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940). Although Moore v. Burdine, 174 So. 279
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937) cites Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 343 (1934), party-
autonomy is probably the basis of the decision.
44. 11 La. Ann. 559 (1856).
45. Id. at 560 (Emphasis added). Cf. Wailes v. Daniell, 14 La. Ann. 578 (1859);
Tillman v. Mosely, 14 La. Ann. 710 (1859); Holloman v. Holloman, 12 La. Ann. 607
(1857). Although the court in Spears must be congratulated for its first accurate appli-
cation of article 10, its use of the term "executed" in the majority opinion to mean
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Likewise, in Bernard v. Scott, 6 involving an instrument in the form
of a common-law mortgage given in Mississippi on land both there
and in Louisiana, the majority adverted to neither lex loci contractus
nor any other mechanistic conflicts'rule, but applied Mississippi law,
based on the intent of the parties to give the instrument a single
character rather than a dual one.
The years between the 1870 revision of the Civil Code and the
end of the century close the period in which lex loci contractus was
cited by Louisiana courts as a general conflicts rule. Although the
courts did not altogether abandon the mechanical approach, article
10 was at least given limited scope as a tool for solving conflicts
problems in contract, as evidenced by the accurate application of the
article in Duncan v. Helm47 decided a year after the Code was revised.
However, in Harris v. Nasits" the court categorically stated "The lex
loci contractus governs . . . this case and not the provisions of our
code." 9 The Harris court arrived at the correct result through the
process of evaluating the parties' relationship in context, but failed
to express the result in terms of article 10. The defendant, a New
Orleans tobacco merchant, purchased a quantity of tobacco while in
New York, giving the plaintiff-seller a draft payable at a New Orleans
bank. When sued upon the draft the merchant defended with the
allegation that the tobacco was "funky, moldy and unsound."5 ° The
court held that the customs of the New York tobacco trade controlled
the rights of the parties to the sale and therefore the merchant was
bound by the quality of a sample he had inspected in New York. The
court probably refused to apply article 10 upon the mistaken notion
that it would have required application of Louisiana law, the place
where performance was to be given, viz., where the draft was to be
paid and the tobacco delivered. However, had the court construed
article 10 in the manner herein suggested, it would have applied New
York law since the parties contracted with reference to the usages of
the New York tobacco trade5' and thereby indicated that they in-
"entered into" (vice, "performed") would cause confusion later. See Fox v. Corry, 149
La. 445, 89 So. 410 (1920); Lachman v. Block, 47 La. Ann. 524, 17 So. 153 (1894); Delta
Equip. v. Cook, 142 So. 2d 427 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
46. 12 La. Ann. 489 (1957). Cf. Gates v. Gaither, 46 La. Ann. 286, 15 So. 50 (1894);
Howe v. Austin, 40 La. Ann. 323 (1888); Miller v. Shotwell, 38 La. Ann. 890 (1886);
Southern Bank v. Wood, 14 La. Ann. 554 (1859); Hayden v. Nutt, 4 La. Ann. 65 (1849);
Smoot v. Russel, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 522 (La. 1823).
47. 22 La. Ann. 418 (1870).
48. 23 La. Ann. 457 (1871).
49. Id. at 458.
50. Id.
51. Civil Code art. 10 includes "the laws and usages" of the place of contracting.
(Emphasis added.)
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tended the contract to "have effect" in New York. Since the court did
examine the facts with a view to determining the parties' motives,
perhaps it can be said that the seed of the more modern approach
which had survived to reappear in Duncan was yet visible behind the
lex loci contractus of Harris." However, the rule lex loci contractus,
although today for the most part a forceless anachronism, has yet to
pass completely from our law. 3 Vestiges remain in cases dealing with
negotiable instruments,54 and the rule still appears in our insurance
law."
An indication of what might be expected in the area of contracts
and related obligations can be seen in a recent Third Circuit case,
Universal CIT Credit Corp. v. Hulett." This was a suit by an assignee
of an Indiana conditional sales contract to recover a deficiency due
after the repossession in Louisiana and sale in Indiana of an automo-
bile. If the plaintiff's rights were determined by Louisiana law, the
deficiency judgment would have been barred because of his failure to
have the automobile appraised prior to the sale. Such appraisement,
however, was not required to obtain a deficiency judgment under
Indiana law. The court held that Louisiana law was applicable be-
52. For example, in Bohn v. Cleaver, 25 La. Ann. 419 (1873), the dissent of Justice
Talliaferro, author of the Harris opinion, cited article 10 and pointed to the intention
of the parties in insisting that the commercial or maritime law should govern the
contract in question. Id. at 422. If such a seed was sown, the plant flowered in Gates
v. Gaither, 46 La. Ann. 286, 15 So. 50 (1894). Space does not permit a description of
Justice Watkins' handling of the complex fact situation presented, but his rational
approach to a conceptual morass should serve as a model to modern applications of
conflicts principles that have existed in Louisiana jurisprudence since Le Breton v.
Nouchet, 3 Mart (O.S.) 60 (La. 1813).
53. See, e.g., Bologna Bros. v. Morrissey, 154 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 245 La. 55, 156 So. 2d 601 (1963).
54. Continental Supply Co. v. Fisher Oil, 150 La. 890, 91 So. 287 (1922); Trouard
v. First Nat'l. Bank of Lake Charles, 247 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Bain v.
Worsham, 159 So. 463 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935). But see LA. R.S. 10:1-105 (Supp.
1974), which adopts the party-autonomy rule.
55. Deane v. McGee, 261 La. 686, 260 So. 2d 669 (1972) (lex loci contractus applied
unless the parties clearly appeared to "have some other place in view"); Morrison v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 249 La. 546, 187 So. 2d 729 (1966). Harmon v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co.,
164 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co., 19 So. 2d 586
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1944); Robbins v. Short, 165 So. 512 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936). Cf.
Coci v. New York Life Ins. Co., 155 La. 1060, 99 So. 871 (1924)(applying common law
deposited acceptance doctrine); Succession of Miller v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 110
La. 652, 34 So. 723 (1903) (assignments of life insurance policies are separate contracts
for conflicts purposes); Harmon v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 164 So. 2d 397 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1964) (group policies are presumed to have effect under the laws of
Louisiana when the claimant resides here).
56. 151 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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cause the automobile had been taken to Louisiana by the conditional
buyer as intended by the parties.57 Summarizing this modem ap-
proach to conflicts law in general, Justice Tate noted:
To decide a case by the application of formal . . . principles is
often not so much a matter of logic . . . as it is the selection by
the court of the forum from among the competing intra-state and
extra-state factors those which that court regards to be signifi-
cant and which justify application of the particular conflict-of-
law principle or principles which afford weight to the. . . factors
found to be significant . . . . We reach this result whether we
regard the significant factor as being that the vehicle was sold to
Louisiana residents for use in Louisiana, that the repossession
actually took place thereafter in Louisiana, that Louisiana has a
valid governmental interest in enforcing its public policy barring
deficiency judgements . . . or whether, as is actually the case, a
combination of all these factors indicates that it is more appropri-
ate for the Louisiana law to be applied by a Louisiana court in
deciding this matter, than that of another forum which has less
significant factual connections with the matter in litigation.58
Although Hulett deals with issues pertaining to property interests
and security devices as well as contractual obligations, it reflects the
importance attached to the intention of the parties and the method
by which Louisiana courts infer that intent, an approach which does
not materially differ from the application of the party-autonomy
rules of the Restatement (Second).
Conclusion
Just as it may be said that the first Restatement did not in fact
restate the process of solving conflict of laws problems in American
courts, the statements of early Louisiana courts were not always in-
dicative of the process they purported to describe. Rather, the general
scheme of judicial process that emerges from an examination of
Louisiana jurisprudence is remarkably similar to that recommended
by the Restatement (Second) and does not differ materially from the
approach followed in the majority of American jurisdictions.
F. Michael Adkins
57. "In Louisiana, the rule has been generally stated to be that the law of the place
where the contract is to have effect determines the rights and obligations of the par-
ties." Id. at 707 (Emphasis added).
58. Id. at 710-11. Cf. Doty v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 186 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1966); DeMary v. Fontenot, 161 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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